In 2024, to our great delight, we had a conversation with David Maimon, Head of Fraud Insights at SentiLink. We’re fortunate to welcome David back for a quarterly series this year to check in on payments fraud writ large – to better understand what’s happening and why.

Listen in to this episode as Yvette and David discuss the evolution and resurgence of check fraud, the increasing sophistication of fraud rings targeting banks and the government, and the adaptation of new technologies, including Generative AI, for criminal activity.

Yvette Bohanan: Hello, I’m Yvette Bohanan, a partner at Glenbrook and your host for this episode of Payments on Fire. In 2024, to our great delight, we had a conversation with David Maimon, Head of Fraud Insights at SentiLink. If you didn’t catch that episode, I encourage you to have a listen. It was number 245. I learned a lot in that conversation and I hope you do too.

Well, here we are in 2025 and I have to pause and reflect that 25 years ago, in January of 2020, at a startup called PaylinX, my phone was ringing off the hook. 1999 was the first retail busy season that fraud appeared on the web with a vengeance. Merchants thought that they had made solid, bankable revenue only to learn as the chargebacks poured in in January, that there was quite a bit of fraud in those numbers. They were calling us to ask us to make a fraud server as a companion to our payment server product. Note that this was before the cloud and before apps and before the formalization of things like machine learning algorithms for fraud detection.

We thought, with all sincerity, that we would have this problem solved in a year. Wow, were we naive. So, to commemorate this 25th anniversary, we have planned a quarterly series this year to check in on payments fraud writ large, to better understand what’s happening and why. And, we are most fortunate to have David Maimon joining us for these conversations.

David, welcome back to Payments on Fire. Thank you so much for joining me for this series. I’m super excited.

David Maimon: Thank you so much for having me again, Yvette. I’m really happy to be here with you.

Yvette Bohanan: I think we’re going to have some very interesting conversations. I’m hoping our listeners agree. So we’re going to just jump right in and I’m going to start with the theme that, you know, as the saying goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. So, let’s start with some old school check fraud that seems to be having a renaissance, a moment, if you will.

It’s been on the rise for a while, and you’ve been talking about this in your posts, I know, all last year. You saw it climbing. So who’s being targeted, and what is the MO around this right now that you’re seeing?

David Maimon: We have started to see check fraud and check theft in the US starting 2021, to be frank. The increase started then and, to be even more exact, I can give you the mid 2021 as the point where we started to see things increasing dramatically. And the reason why we can attribute a specific time point for that is that we are still and we have been monitoring dark net and telegram and other social media platforms systematically since 2019.

And so on a monthly basis, we have a sample of markets. We monitor, we download information from them, and then we simply tally the different types of scams, different types of frauds, different types of MOs that we find out there. Prior to 2021, we’ve seen the checks, of course. But I can tell you that on a typical month in 2020, we were able to find around 400 checks. But then come 2021 on a typical month, in 2021, we were able to find around 5,000 checks.

Then come 2022 and 2023 and 2024, and then the volume of checks we’re able to find on a monthly basis were staggering. 10,000 checks on a monthly basis.

Yvette Bohanan: So when you say you found 10,000 checks, you’re finding distinct routing and account numbers that have been compromised, compromised and used, what constitutes a find in your categorization?

David Maimon: It’s a great question. Take a look at your checkbook and once you see the check, that’s essentially what we find out there. We see an image of a check with the PII’s on it, with the payee information, the payer information, the balance on the checks. Most often the account and routing number will not be available.

They will be redacted. And starting mid 2024, we see some of the other information I just mentioned, like the payors name, the payees name, some of the balances that they’re being redacted as well, because more and more people are being aware of this issue at this point. But, early 2021, all this information was available for us and we were able to see victims’ names. We’re able to see banks’ information. We’re able to see accounts numbers. We’re able to see where those checks were coming from. Granted, we’re able to see all kinds of checks. We’re able to see personal checks and business checks and governmental checks and IRS checks. And unfortunately, we’re still seeing those nowadays. I can get you the most recent stats that we have from the month of November that we were able to see over 7,000 checks on a sample of 80 markets we’re consciously monitoring.

The MO for this is quite simple. It began with criminals simply robbing mail carriers for their arrow keys. The arrow keys are the keys that essentially open the USPS collection boxes, and then simply going to those mailboxes in the middle of the night, opening them, emptying them, chauffeuring the mail to hideout locations, usually cheap hotel rooms or cheap rentals where the rest of the gangs awaited. At the beginning of this, what folks were doing where they were washing the checks, meaning they soaked the checks in nail polish removers or antifreeze liquids and then they had to find mules to help them cash the checks or deposit the checks. But, at some point, they ran out of family members and friends, so they started selling the checks. And this is how we sort of realized that this crisis is happening.

As I mentioned, I started talking about it in January of 2022, being very vocal about this and trying to raise red flags. And at the time, nobody believed me because the pushback I got from many out there was who still write checks and I’m like, I don’t know, but I can give you a list of thousands of victims I found earlier this morning as indication that these guys, as well as the government, write a lot of those checks.

Yvette Bohanan: That’s why I’m laughing. It’s like governments and who’s expecting checks, a lot of local governments, state governments still want checks. So the other side of this for those new to payments or maybe not realizing, once you have that routing and account number information, you also have access to the ACH system. It is the same translation into an account, right? So it’s like double trouble, in that sense, right?

David Maimon: 100%. So once you have a check, you washing it and stealing 5,000 dollars, right, or more if you’re dealing with a business check, right, it’s just a start of a very long road you can take the victim and the bank to, right? Because as you mentioned, once you have a check, you have the complete account information on the check, so you can start charging the account.

You can, and this is some of the new thing we started to see, we started to see these guys doing in 2023, you can start manufacturing checks yourself, so to speak, right? You have the account information, you don’t need to wash the checks. Now, we are familiar with many criminals out there who have their own labs, so to speak, of manufacturing checks.

We’re talking about personal checks, business checks, but also IRS checks, treasury checks, with all the watermarks on there, the security controls, those checks are usually vetted with the TCVS website where you actually check the check is legit. These guys are manufacturing high quality checks at this point, right?

So this is the other thing they can do. So they can charge the account and manufacture more checks and then the other significant thing that as a fraudster you can do with a check is you can start working with the identity on the check. You can simply start, you can steal the identity, you can supplement the missing information that you need for the identity, like the social security number, like date of birth from the ecosystem. It’s fairly easy to find all information from the online fraud ecosystem. And then you have an identity you can start working with and if the owner of the identity hasn’t really froze their credit score, you can ask for loans. You can open bank accounts with no issues at all. You can purchase guns if you want, right? So you can do a lot with the identity and all that essentially comes from the check you stole a couple of minutes ago from USPS.

So it’s a major issue we’re experiencing starting mid 2021. And unfortunately, even though we’ve been talking a lot about it during the last four years now, I can’t believe I’m saying this, right, there’s still no solution in the horizon.

Yvette Bohanan: So I’m going to throw one more wrinkle in it and then we’ll talk about what can we do to help ourselves here. The wrinkle I also see is once you start using this to access the account, the routing and account information, you see situations where they start doing the test deposit type transactions so that they can open up cryptocurrency accounts, new different accounts, wallets, that sort of thing.

And now you can start to open up the whole angle of money laundering, scams, like a romance scam, whatever’s going on here to like exit funds quickly. So you see all sorts of different angles to this. We have to come up with a different name. One of my pet peeves about fraud is we have a name for everything and we appreciate these problems too much and we don’t look at the sources of risk that we’re not controlling properly.

But in this case, I actually am going to switch gears and say, I think we need something because it’s really not check fraud. Like you’re saying, it’s so much more sophisticated. The technology is more sophisticated. They’re more savvy about how these systems work. Payment systems used to be a lot of a black box, right?

And now people are sort of figuring all of this out. But it’s not check fraud. It’s not writing a check or kiting checks, like Catch Me If You Can, or whatever. It’s like a gateway to identity, a gateway to criminal activity, a gateway to mule scam accounts. It’s a check gateway.

David Maimon: I think you’re 100 percent correct. I’ve been studying this for a long period of time and we see the evolution of this, can you can you imagine, the evolution of check fraud in the ecosystem. I mean, that is where we are at at this point. One of the things that we’re seeing folks doing a lot with checks once they have access to the check is, they take over the account, they call the bank, they, again, supplement all the details they need from the ecosystem, they take over the account and, at this point, and I can tell you that this started in 2023, the checks, which we’re able to see on the markets, were sold along with PIIs as well as account balance. And that is some useful information for you as a customer, right, who wants to purchase a check to know, right? You want to know how much money there is in the account and for you to work with, right? This is how sophisticated, and I agree with you 100%, it’s really a gateway. Once you have a check, it’s a gateway to so many different types of crime simply because you have access to the account and you have access to the identity.

Yvette Bohanan: Exactly, exactly. Here’s the thing. I think one of the observations we can make, and this is like anyone who’s been in product management or engineering, operations for years. When you start doing new stuff and you don’t deprecate the old system and the old stuff or update it tremendously, you start leaving gaps and fraud always goes to the gaps.

We got ACH and then we got different things. Now we’re in fast payments, right? Everyone’s investment in, whoever the stakeholder is, the banks, the PSPs, the processor, investment is always going to the new stuff. And here we have this legacy, legacy, hundreds of years legacy system hasn’t changed hardly at all. Well, maybe there were some big changes around 2008, 2009, but basically that was it, right? So it’s antiquated. Why are we still printing this information on pieces of paper and mailing it? But then couldn’t we put some kind of an encrypted QR code instead of the magnetic ink with the routing and account number in plain sight? Couldn’t we not allow people to put all their PII on a check?

David Maimon: I’m with you 100 percent with respect to the legacy tools we had and the fact that they weren’t really able to detect this issue. To be frank, I was surprised that nobody was sort of talking about this issue loudly, right, in 2021, 2022.

And I agree with you that that technology was not up to date. I think that with this crisis and with the realization that check fraud is definitely here to stay at least for the next 10 years or so, there are more and more investments. We definitely see more and more companies investing more and trying to find solutions both in terms of scanning, as well as putting together consortiums, which will allow you to understand whether a check has been stolen or has been found on some of the online fraud ecosystems out there and then potentially get red flags to the companies who are doing check fraud prevention and detection.

Unfortunately, this is not unique to fraud fighting, right? I think that this is how we are as human, right? We always invest in new things and we neglect to think about the simple thing. We have to cover our bases first. And unfortunately, in the context of check fraud, we started to do that, a little too too late.

I think that had we started working in the technology and the banks, adopting the technology quicker, potentially we could have saved a lot of the money. I know that there’s movement now to invest more in new tools. But it’ll be a while until all those tools will be implemented and that we can prevent this issue completely

Yvette Bohanan: Whatever we’re going to rename it, but check fraud, that’s a big, still a big topic, unfortunately. So when we were getting ready to record here today, we were catching up and you mentioned that fraud rings are targeting banks. Of course, right? They’re the prime target of a lot of things, but they’re targeting them in very methodical, interesting ways.

Let’s just open it up. What should banks be paying attention to right now? What’s going on that they should have their radar up, they should be thinking about, what can we do with policy procedure, technology to help?

David Maimon: Yeah, one important thing to understand, the fraud rings target banks, but it also target the government. Unfortunately, we see a lot of that still happening.

What we see in terms of MO is quite simple. Folks are using stolen identities they find in data dumps, which were left and are now being sold for dollar per identity, something ridiculous like that, on the dark net. They use, they take the identities, they supplement all the relevant information around the identity, they make sure that profile has a phone, unique phone number, they build some history. And to be frank, the fact that they’re trying to build history and they’re not very successful there is to our advantage at this point, if we take into consideration the entire history of a human being and you actually check for it when you try to verify folks’ identities, but they are doing their best in order to build those identities. And then they simply submit applications, right? And they try to open new bank accounts. They try to create new credit lines. They rent apartments. They simply try to build stories around the identities.

They do the same, right, in the context of unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits is still a thing in this country. In several states in the United States are still experiencing this issue as a real issue. California is still experiencing this as an issue. Massachusetts is experiencing the issue of unemployment benefit fraud throughout 2024. In fact, this is one of the reasons I believe we are seeing an uptake in the volume of account openings using stolen and synthetic identities in the Massachusetts area.

Those fraud rings are very coordinated. They’re part of criminal groups who used to sell drugs, to an extent they still sell drugs, but they realized that it’s now way easier and less expensive for you to put together a bunch of individuals with several phones and simply start applying using someone else’s identities to open a new bank account and take loans on behalf of individuals.

It’s way more useful, way less risky if you think about it. You don’t have to stand on the street with a gun and wait for the police to come by and question you. You do it from your parents apartment, or from a cheap hotel room, from Starbucks. And it’s very difficult to stop that at this point.

The MO is quite simple. It takes some time to sort of flush it and make sure that you are an expert in it, but it doesn’t take too long. I mean, you don’t have to school, right, for four years, in order to become a very good fraudster. That goes without saying.

Yvette Bohanan: Right, right. And so, account opening, certain attack vectors. The other thing that came up recently in a conversation I was having with a financial institution was they were seeing more fraudulent activity of funds exiting accounts now. There’s been this sort of uptick and prevalence and faster automation around account opening, it’s sort of like the unintended result of making things easier for good, legitimate people to open accounts and stuff, right? Everybody wants to be digital, right? But the other side that they’re seeing now is more fraud around exiting funds out of accounts. So what’s going on with that?

David Maimon: Yeah, account takeover is a big deal still and GenAI contributed to that, maybe we can talk about it later. But it’s funny that you’re mentioning this. Last week, I was actually posting about investment accounts and the fact that fraudsters are expressing more and more interest in those accounts. What they’re trying to do is they’re trying to take over those accounts as well and take some of the money, liquidize some of the money, and send the money out of those accounts to accounts that they were able to open on behalf of the accounts or sometimes even accounts which are linked already to the investment account, which is really interesting.

I mean, the MO is quite unique because some of the instances we’ve seen out there when folks are selling the credentials to the accounts they took over includes PIIs. They include balance on the accounts. Of course, usually you’ll see a screenshot of the account. Also, they will provide with information about the account functionality.

In other words, they will tell you whether they have Zelle on the account. They will tell you whether there’s account attached to that account as well. And that information again is very useful for you as a fraudsters because you will know if you buy these two accounts, you actually can funnel money from one account to another.

And that kind of explain what you are seeing and what you’re discussing with previous guests. We definitely see movement of money outside of those accounts to accounts which are linked with those accounts already and then from those accounts to other accounts that the criminals own, also from the investment accounts and the accounts that folks have access to to new accounts that the criminals are creating using stolen identities, obviously.

Yvette Bohanan: Right. And so if it’s a new account that they’re creating and then they’re moving it around from one account to another or a series of accounts, that to me feels more like a kind of a money laundering sort of activity versus accounts linking to investment accounts and then you’re shifting very fast money coming through these accounts to sort of exit it before anyone notices or gets alerted, right?

So there’s laundering and then there’s theft, right? And who’s the victim, right? It’s really the, what’s the objective behind it? But they’re using a lot of those same tactics to achieve the both. The MOs are being used, but the objectives are different, and we have to stop, I think, thinking of compliance, money laundering, BSA, and how that’s done, conducted, in terms of money laundering, and theft and how that’s done. Organizations are set up where these are two completely different functions, and a lot of times they’re not talking to each other about what they’re seeing. They’re using different words, even worse, to describe what they’re seeing, and they don’t realize it’s exactly the same tactics.

And if you can solve the risk, if you can close the risk gaps, you actually benefit both. Right? We don’t think that way on the good guy side enough.

David Maimon: I agree with you that we don’t think that way on the good guys side. And it’s a problem. But when we talk about it, we realize that there’s so many MOs, there’s so many plays. I keep talking about different plays and it really, as a fraudster, it really depends on your motivator.

Why are you trying to accomplish, so to speak? We all know why we’re doing this, but what are you trying to accomplish? Are you trying to launder money, or are you trying to buy, funnel the money into gift cards, and then run away with the gift cards? Are you trying to funnel the money to cryptocurrency, and then from the wallet to a different account, or a different wallet, to a different country?

It really depends on what your goal is, but again, once you have access to the account, you can do a lot with it. Sky’s the limit, so to speak, right? You and I talked a lot about that in the past. One of the things that I really like in trying to understand fraud and study fraud is the fact that these guys are so creative with respect to the new plays they come up with on a monthly basis pretty much.

And the fact that we do not really think like they do in terms of, okay, try to understand what can I do now with the account? Where can I find the, funnel the money to? Okay. I funneled the money to that account. What next? That keeps us in a huge disadvantage. That’s why we unfortunately keep losing. But hopefully we’ll be able to get better and better in fighting these guys.

Yvette Bohanan: Absolutely. So we started by saying the more things change, the more they stay the same, but they are changing. And one of the big topics that we talk about a lot now is, we started 20 years ago in the digital era, right, just to sort of set the table here. We had cloud computing, smartphones, NFC, all that stuff that kind of brought us into the digital era.

Now we’re in this transition phase, right, we’re coming out of the digital era, we’re going into the GenAI era, we have all sorts of things happening, lots of new buzzwords, which happens at the beginning of an era like agentic payments is the new idea, and all of these different things going on.

But when you think about the Generative AI technology holistically, how is it changing these MOs? What can you do now with GenAI as a fraudster that you couldn’t do, say, two years ago?

David Maimon: Yeah, it’s a great question. And it really goes back to your goal and what you’re trying to accomplish and the type of play you have in mind. So I can tell you that in the context of account takeover, we definitely see a dramatic increase. We have seen a dramatic increase in the volume of compromised bank accounts starting July of 2023.

As I mentioned, we document things and, we keep collecting data from the ecosystem on a weekly basis and then aggregate to the monthly basis. We try to figure out an answer for why we’re seeing what we’re seeing. So July of 2023 was a really important point to the ecosystem because that is when Worm GPT, Fraud GPT and some of the other criminal GPTs entered the ecosystem.

That is when we started to see criminal selling access to Fraud GPT for 500 bucks a month. That was extremely interesting because July 2023, we were able to see in the context of account takeover around 2200 compromised bank accounts being offered for sale on the sample of markets we had, again, 80 markets.

Then comes August of 2023, and then we see the numbers going crazy and reaching to more than 5500 compromised bank accounts. 165 percent increase in the volume of compromised bank accounts over a period of a month. And then since then, we have seen a very steady, high volume of compromised bank accounts being offered for sales out there.

We’re still at the 5,000, 6,000 compromised bank accounts on a monthly basis. We have strong reason to believe that GenAI contributed to that because Fraud GPT, Worm GPT, all these GPT tools are very useful for the criminals while putting together this phishing email, the smishing text.

They’re very good in helping them putting together the scam pages, which will allow them to funnel or sort of route the victims to. They’re very good in supporting the remote desktop protocol installation, which is key right now, right in the context of account takeover. As I mentioned earlier, now we’re actually seeing accounts being offered for sale along with access to the victim’s network, home network, as well as computers. In other words, folks will hack your account from your computer.

Yvette Bohanan: Let’s just stop here for a second. And this is because Fraud GPT, can we just define Fraud GPT? What is your definition of that?

David Maimon: It’s the criminal brother of ChatGPT. It’s just criminals were able to jailbreak ChatGPT. With ChatGPT, if you try to do something criminal, for example, you will try to write a worm which will steal someone’s cookies or someone’s identity, you won’t be able to do that.

But with WormGPT and some other tools out there like FraudGPT, that will be, something that you will be able to do. It will be feasible for you to create those smishing text. You will be able to get instructions with respect to how to do specific criminal things, including writing worms, malicious software, and so on.

Yvette Bohanan: And they broke into that in 2023. Effectively what you’re saying is they jailbroke ChatGPT. So they basically took out the controls that ChatGPT had put in so that you can’t use it for nefarious activity. So now they have this access to all the information they need, and then some, to basically conduct these schemes. And they’re now to the point where they they have so much information and they know how to use the GenAI tool that they can hack into your home network and hack your account from your computer. Did I hear you right? Like, did I really hear?

David Maimon: Yeah, so, unfortunately, I think that that specific functionality is not necessarily due to the development in GenAI, because we know that folks were doing the remote desktop protocol starting 2022 or so. I’ve seen evidence for them doing this-

Yvette Bohanan: But they had to get you to help them, right? They had to get you to click or do something.

David Maimon: And that’s exactly what the tool does. It helps you deploy the remote desktop protocol. It helps you understand how to work with it. It helps you guide and navigate the sometimes complicated process of engaging in this type of crime.

So GenAI, and FraudGPT and WormGPT specifically, based on our understanding of the impact of the tool on the ecosystem definitely resulted in dramatic increase in the volume of account takeover starting 2023. But this is just one of the tools, right? ChatGPT, FraudGPT, now folks talk about GhostGPT. This is something quite recent. I haven’t had a chance to work with the tool. In fact, one of my students tried to purchase access to the tool, but she couldn’t for some reason. So I’m not really sure about the functionality of GhostGPT, but with WormGPT, with FraudGPT, those tools are old tools already, right? 2023. And folks had a lot of experience with them, so we know that there’s some impact there. In addition to GenAI impacting ATO, we are seeing a lot of usage for GenAI in the context of deepfake technology, in the context of voice cloning, in the context of bypassing liveliness tests, so to speak.

This is one of those areas which every time I talk about it, it’s kind of uncomfortable because you see those images of individuals swapping faces with images they find online and then communicating with other people pretending to be someone they’re not, and then convince them to do crazy things, like taking off their clothes, right, in the context of online romance scams. Building rapport and convincing them to actually send money to you, in the context of investment fraud and pig butchering, which I don’t really like the name or the title. Convincing you to invest a large amount of money, right, in accounts that at the end of the day do not really exist and in coins that do not really exist. We see a lot of that happen, right?

We also see this technology being used in order to bypass liveliness test in financial institutions and also the government. This is, again, one of those things that you have to see in order to believe. There are a lot of videos out there that we’re seeing out there of folks swapping faces and use the new face they have to create a video. And simply hijack or interject camera, the computer camera, inject the video and then bypass the liveliness test by simply having their new face, moving their head right and left, up and down and bypassing the liveliness that way. Mind boggling to see that. We’ve seen a recent video posted out there is from a liveliness test, which was went wrong, so to speak, in one of the major financial institutions here in the United States, and unfortunately, we see more and more of that happening. So GenAI is definitely one of those drivers, which help push liveliness tests, identity verification, to the next level.

Yvette Bohanan: Okay. So, we’re in the era. We’re coming out of digital to a whole new ballgame. When we were talking a while back on a podcast, probably two years ago, almost now with Frank Young, we said, this technology is here, and we weren’t talking about fraud or risk management per se.

We were just talking about the tech and we said, you may like it. You may not like it. You may believe it. You may not believe it. But you need to lean into it. And particularly executives, senior managers, directors, boards, right? They need to understand the potential good and bad here. So at every level of the organization, you got to get your minds around it.

What should the payments professionals out there who are listening be thinking when it comes to updating defenses against this new generation that we’re in?

David Maimon: A great question, but again, it goes back to the issue of which type of fraud we have in mind. If we have in mind account takeover, then we need to do one thing. If we are talking about check fraud or any other type of fraud, we need to do other things.

I think in general, we need to cover our bases. This goes back to what we talked about in the context of check fraud. We need to make sure that the basics of what we do is close to perfect. Nothing can be completely perfect, but close to perfect. We need to make sure that when we are trying to identify or verify someone’s identity, we do our due diligence and we do our best when trying to understand the history around that individual, because documents could be faked, faces could be swapped, liveliness test could be bypassed quite easily. So we need to go back to our bases and try to think about how do we verify someone’s identity without really needing all those documents, all those documents that easily could be faked, right?

And I think to do that, you definitely need to look at the history, the complete history of that individual. You need to tap into several, multiple databases and simply verify the identity out there against all those databases, right? That’s the basic thing that we can do which, at the end of the day, will help tremendously with respect to verifying folks identity when we try to open a new account or when we even try to verify that the legitimate owner of an account is getting access to the account. That is the most important thing. And I think that goes very long way. You look at the basics, try to figure out what are some of the basic things, simple things, rudimentary things that we can do in order to make sure that, GenAI cannot really impact us.

Having said that, we definitely need to invest in technology, and I know that there are many companies right now, are working on addressing this issue of GenAI. I know that right now, FIs, the government, everybody’s quite worried about GenAI and the fact that faces could be swapped that we said, and that liveliness test could be bypassed quite easily. I’m not familiar with a very good tool, unfortunately, at this point, which will allow folks to flag those issues, but I know that a lot of companies are now investing a lot in finding a solution to that. Now, to tell you that that will be 100 percent successful and that we’re able to prevent it, unfortunately I can’t because I know some of my subjects, my research subjects, and I know that they will find a way to go around this as well. But, I know that there’s a lot of investment being done in the context of detecting fake GenAIs and we’ll see what happens.

Yvette Bohanan: Yes, we will see what happens. So is probably a lot more that’s going to happen. That’s why we’re doing a whole series with you. So, unfortunately, here we are. Brave new world, new year. We’re going to wrap this one. And we look forward to talking with you again very, very soon about some more topics and so we can keep the education going with all the folks out there that need to hear about what’s happening.

So thank you so much for all the hard work you and your team’s doing. For those of you who are listening, thanks for joining us. And until next time, keep up the good work. Thanks, David.